Abstract: Many entrepreneurs work informally because it is costly to start and run a business legally. Using a dynamic model of industry equilibrium, I show that the costs of the legal system can explain the cross country variability of the size of the informal economy. The model implies that the business start-up costs are more important than taxes and labor market regulations. Small, less productive, entrepreneurs, facing high entry costs, start informally, waiting to become more productive before legalizing. Informality is often the doorstep of the legal system.
Introduction
Why do many entrepreneurs work in the informal economy, outside the legal system? One plausible, albeit obvious, answer is that working inside the legal system is costly. These costs of the legal system can be crudely classi ed into two macro categories: operational costs, that arise because legal rms must comply with many laws and regulations, and start-up costs, that include the one-time fees required to legally open a business and the costs of going through the related bureaucratic procedures. In this paper I propose a dynamic model of industry equilibrium to study the e ects of both operational and start-up costs of on the size and cross country variability of the informal economy. Together with the business start-up costs identi ed by Djankov et al. (2002) , I consider two operational costs: taxes and labor market regulations. The main result of the analysis is that start-up costs matter more than taxes and labor market regulations.
The model that I propose builds on Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and extends it to an economy with taxation and with two sectors, the legal and the informal. Legal and informal rms coexist and informals can legalize with the payment of a xed start-up cost. These new features still deliver a tractable framework, with a rich characterization of the rms' dynamics in both sectors. More generally, the model allows me to build a theory of informality based on rm dynamics, which is new to the literature. In particular, the numerical analysis shows that if start-up costs are high, then smaller, less productive, rms can only start informally, waiting to become more productive and to grow before legalizing. This behavior is consistent with the idea of entrepreneurship rst formalized by Jovanovic (1982) , according to which the only way for potential entrepreneurs to learn about their e ciency is entering the market. Upon entry, they survive and grow only in case they are productive and exit otherwise. My model with an informal sector implies that if it is too costly to do this learning process in the legal sector, because of the start-up costs, then some of the potential entrepreneurs will choose to do it in the informal sector. In this respect, the model implies a view of the informal sector as the Doorstep of the o cial one.
The model implies that the start-up costs explain roughly 75% of the cross country variability of the informal economy, while operational costs only 25%. I obtain this result feeding in the model the empirical measures of the costs and analyzing the resulting cross section of the informal economy. The great advantage of my numerical methodology is that, using a structural model, I am able to isolate the e ect of start-up and operational costs from potential confoundings, unlike previous empirical works.
The open question, then, is how to validate the model. First, I show that the characteristics of the informal sector delivered by the model are consistent with the available survey evidence. In particular, informal rms are smaller and less productive than their legal counterparts and a very small number of them survives in the market. The ones that survive are the most productive, which grow and, relatively quickly, legalize. This implies that, in each period, only a small fraction of existing legal rms started as informal. To independently validate my cross country exercise, I also show that the simulated cross section of the informal economy is very similar to the empirical measures obtained with several estimation methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brie y summarizes the related literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 clari es the details of the simulation. Section 5 describes the main properties of the model and their relationship with the available survey evidence. The key results are discussed in section 6. The empirical validation of the numerical exercise is the subject of section 7. In section 8 I analyze the robustness of the model results to alternative assumptions. Section 9 concludes. A companion appendix, available upon request, documents extensively the properties of the model and the algorithm used to compute the equilibrium. The appendix also includes two model extensions: to labor taxation and to productivity enhancing public goods for legal rms.
Related Literature
The analysis of the informal (hidden, shadow) economy is the subject of a rapidly spreading literature, following the Rational Choice tradition initiated by Becker (1978) and fundamentally inspired by the work of DeSoto (1989) , who rst extensively analyzed and described the life of the informal entrepreneurs in the city of Lima.
The closest work to my analysis is D'Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012) . Their paper develops a model of informality with nancial frictions and use it to explain the TFP di erentials across countries. In their model the choice for a rm between the formal and informal sector is irreversible, against the available empirical evidence summarized by Maloney (2004) , De Paula and Scheinkman (2008) and LaPorta and Shleifer (2008) . In contrast, in my model informal rms are allowed to switch to the legal sector upon the payment of a startup cost, consistently with the above evidence. This feature allows me to build a theory of informality based on rm dynamics, which is the main contribution of my work.
Another closely related work is Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) . In a static model with credit constraints for informal rms, they study how the enforcement of nancial contracts and the regulation costs a ect the informal economy. They nd that regulation costs account for most of the observed empirical di erences between the US and Europe. Di erently from their work, I use a dynamic model of entry and exit, that allows a clear separate identi cation of the start-up from a xed, per period, cost of production. In addition, with my dynamic framework I can keep track of the changes in the distribution of rms in the legal and informal sectors and analyze the characteristics of new start-ups. However, I do not have nancial constraints in my model. In a related contribution, Prado (2011) also studies the e ect of regulation, enforcement and taxation on the size of the informal economy within a static model.
On the empirical side, previous existing works, recently summarized by Straub (2005) , already showed that high start-up costs are correlated with large informal sectors, but found only weak evidence for the relationships between labor regulations and informality and between taxes and informality. The rst fact has been extensively documented by Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) , who built a data set that identi es all the business start-up costs for a large cross section of countries. Using the same data, Auriol and Warlters (2005) similarly report a positive and signi cant e ect of start-up costs on the size of the informal economy. In a more recent contribution, Estrin and Mickiewicz (2012) study the relationship between entry and the size of the informal economy empirically. They nd that bigger informal sectors predict lower entry rates in the legal sector, which implies that the competition from informals lowers the incentives to start a new business legally. The second fact emerges from the work by Botero, Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) . After collecting a comprehensive data set on labor market regulations, they were unable to nd any systematic relationship with the size of the informal economy. A similar result appears in Besley and Burgess (2004) , where a pro-worker legislation is shown to be positively associated with the size of the informal sector in a panel of Indian states. The relationship between taxes and informality is much more controversial. Among others, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) nd evidence of a positive association between taxes and the size of the informal economy, but Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) , with a di erent empirical strategy, found a negative association. Lemieux, Fortin and Frechette (1994) and Davis and Henrekson (2004) also report ambiguous results. The main di erence between my work and all of these empirical contributions is methodological: I employ a dynamic structural model to study the contribution of di erent costs numerically. The main advantage of my methodology is that, using a structural model, I can isolate the e ects of the single costs better. This is particularly important in the context of a cross country analysis, where the problem of omitted variables is particularly pervasive.
Recent contributions on the informal economy also include: Sarte (2000) , who studies the e ect of informality on growth in the presence of rent-seeking bureaucrats; Azuma and Grossman (2002) , who show how the Government, in the presence of unobservable endowments, can extract from producers such a high amount to force the poorly endowed in the informal sector; Dessy and Pallage (2003) , who propose a model with strategic complementarities where legal rms pay taxes that nance the provision of a productivity enhancing good; Fugazza and Jacques (2003) , who develop a matching model of the labor market with formal and informal workers, showing that policies which encourage the participation in the legal sector are more e ective than deterrence; Busato and Chiarini (2004) , who develop a business cycle model with a legal and an informal sector to stress the risk sharing opportunities allowed by the reallocation of labor supply across sectors; Maloney (2004) , who studies the informal sector empirically in Latin America highlighting its entrepreneurial nature; Gerxhani (2004) , who compares the informal sectors in developed and less developed countries; Choi and Thum (2005) , who show how the option for an entrepreneur to produce illegally reduces the rents that corrupt public o cials can extract; Amaral and Quintin (2006) , who show that informal rms substitute low-skilled labor for physical capital because of nancial constraints; Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008) , who show, empirically, that the quality of the legal system is an important determinant of informality; De Paula and Scheinkman (2008) , who build equilibrium models of informality and test them on a survey of Brazilian rms, showing that informality spreads along the supply chain in the presence of VAT collected with the credit system; La Porta and Shleifer (2008) , who show, with survey data, that informal rms are ine cient, less capitalized and worse managed than legal rms; Blackburn, Bose and Capasso (2012) , who highlight the trade-o between evading taxes and o ering collateral for investments, which means that the incentive to evade taxes is higher in less nancially developed countries; Capasso and Jappelli (2013) , who also show, empirically, a negative relationship between nancial development and tax evasion as a consequence of the trade-o between tax evasion and the necessity to have collateral for investments; Ordonez (2014) , who builds a general equilibrium model to show how incomplete tax enforcement decreases aggregate productivity and output.
The Model
The model builds on the framework developed by Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) (HR henceforth) and extends it to an economy composed of two sectors: the legal, where the rms comply with all the laws and regulations, and the informal, where they don't. The goods produced in the two sectors share the same characteristics but, since they are produced with di erent technologies (say in a regular factory or in a residential basement) and since they are sold in two di erent markets¹ (for instance a regular shop or an occasional street vendor-peddler), they fetch di erent prices. This feature implies that the model completely abstracts from intrinsically illegal products: a good produced in the informal sector would be perfectly legal if produced within the legal sector.
Legal rms must pay three di erent operational costs associated with the legal system: a xed cost c f because of the necessity to comply with all relevant laws and regulations, that either involve a fee or a time consuming bureaucratic procedure, a proportional ring cost, or severance payment, ϕ and a proportional tax τ y on each unit of output produced. The pro t of a legal rm j at time t is:
where I is the indicator function, p t is the price of the good in the legal market, w t the wage rate and f (n jt , a jt ) the production function, that depends upon employment n jt and upon the level of an idiosyncratic technological shock a jt . To keep the model simple, I assume, as in HR, a power speci cation for the production function, with f (n jt , a jt ) = e a jt n α jt and a Markov process for the exogenous technological shock, as described by the transition function F(a jt , a jt+ ). Importantly, the inclusion of the xed cost c f , as in HR, is fundamental to distinguish between exiting rms and rms that do not produce output, which allows to meaningfully talk about rm's exit. The last term in expression (1) is the ring cost, modeled, as in HR, as a proportional (severance) payment ϕ on the di erence between the previous and the actual level of employment, whenever this di erence is positive (i.e. in case of a reduction of labor input). I do not include hiring costs in the model because their impact on the model equilibrium is qualitatively similar to ring costs (they lower the discounted value of future pro ts, reducing the size and growth rate of legal businesses) but quantitatively modest, since they become relevant only when the rm is hit by a positive productivity shock, that increases the pro ts and makes the rm more willing to pay them. The informal sector of the economy is the new feature of my model. First of all, informal rms are not subject to severance payments and, therefore, they can freely re workers without any extra cost. In addition, informal rms do not pay taxes, but are subject to random audits² that, with exogenous probability π, result in the seizure of the output. Alternatively, I could have assumed that, upon auditing, the informal rm would have been forced to pay the output tax, perhaps with some proportional ne. I assume, instead, the seizure of the production because I want to distinguish my model of informal production from a model of tax evasion. This feature of the model also di erentiates it from D'Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012) , that do not have enforcement. The pro t of an informal rm k at time t is: Porta and Shleifer (2008) . 2 In this respect the model is very stylized because it does not consider the e ect of size on enforcement probability, i.e. the fact that bigger rms are easier to audit and more visible, which gives the entrepreneurs an incentive to remain small. Ordonez (2013) provides a model in which he studies such interactions and, in general, the e ects of enforcement on the legal and illegal sector. 3 Legal businesses also transfer resources to such organizations. In fact the primary source of revenue for organizations like the Sicilian Ma a, the Camorra (based in Campania, a region in southern Italy) or the N'drangheta (mainly operating in Calabria, southern Italy) is from extortions on legal businesses, typically under the treat of violence.
of informality are the impossibility to access legal courts, for contract enforcement and dispute resolution, and the di culty to obtain external nancing. In this respect, the model is very stylized, since I use just one xed cost as a reduced form to model several features that I do not consider explicitly. The reason why I chose this strategy is because I want to have a tractable model with a manageable computational procedure. For instance, modeling nancing constraint, perhaps adding a nancial sector and the choice between internal and external nance, would have complicated the framework and the solution procedure. In addition, it would have made the comparative statics much more di cult. Modeling the access to courts, on the other hand, would have required a more complicated contracting environment, again complicating the framework. Furthermore, the importance of these omitted factors is not clearly established. For nancing constraints, for instance, there is evidence that small rms are nancially constrained even if they are legal. Therefore, for a new start-up, which is typically small, the lower cost of credit, or its greater availability, is not an important factor in the choice between starting legally or informally. The inability to access to courts is also unlikely to be a signi cant cost for informal businesses in countries where the judicial trials are long and uncertain, perhaps also subject to capture or corruption.
To keep the model as simple as possible, I assume that the legal production is a function of a legal labor input n t only and, similarly, that the informal production is a function of an informal labor input n i t only. In practice, it is often the case that legal rms employ part of their labor force informally. In this sense the model is di erent from a tax evasion model, where the rms optimally choose how much of their production and pro ts to report to the tax administration and how many of their workers to hire regularly. In my model, the entrepreneurs can only choose to be completely legal or illegal. This assumption is what allows me to solve the model (relatively) easily for the stationary distributions of legal and illegal rms.
At the beginning of each period, incumbent rms in the legal sector choose whether to stay in the sector or exit, as in HR. Incumbent informal rms, conversely, choose whether to stay in the informal sector, exit from the market or legalize their activities, switching to the legal sector upon the payment of a xed cost c e .
The possibility for informal rms to switch to the legal sector is the crucial new element of my model, that di erentiates it from other similar contributions such as Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) and D 'Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012) . In addition, this feature is what allows me to develop a theory of informality based on rm dynamics. The legal start-up costs c e include both the monetary payments required to legally start a business and the opportunity cost to comply with all the mandatory bureaucratic procedures. Informal rms that are audited face a more restricted choice set and must either legalize or exit. Legal rms that exit must pay the ring cost (which can be zero, in case of no labor market regulation), while no payment is due by exiting informals. Consistently with the choice of having either fully legal or fully illegal rms, with the only di erence being a registration (upon the payment of the entry cost), I model the choice of legalizing an informal activity as irreversible: legal rms are not allowed to disappear from the legal market and to start producing informally. As it will be clear later, in the model the legal rms are, on average, big, both in terms of output and in terms of employment. This means that they are visible. Thus it seems arti cial to assume that they can suddenly hide their operation completely, since this implies a cancellation from all the public registers while they are still on the market, perhaps on a smaller scale than before. Nevertheless, in the context of this model, this is not really an assumption: for many realistic parameterizations, legal rms never choose to switch to the informal sector, even if they are allowed to do so. In particular, changing the model assumption and allowing legal rms to become informal, still results in an almost zero rate of legal rms moving to the informal sector. Basically, since legal rms are big and productive, and since productivity is persistent, they simply keep producing legally unless the productivity shock is very small, in which case it is better to close down altogether because they will not be pro table even in the informal sector. Firms that stay in each market pay the corresponding xed cost, observe the productivity shock and choose the optimal level of production and labor. The value function of a legal rm j is:
The value function of an informal rm k is instead:
If the informal rm is not audited (with probability −π), then it switches to the legal sector if the expected present value of a legal business, net of the entry cost, is bigger than the expected present value of an informal business (Ea W − c e > Ea V). If the opposite is true, then it is better to stay in the informal sector. If neither of the two expected values is positive ( > Ea W − c e and > Ea V), then the best choice is to exit from the market. Audited rms (with probability π) do not have the option to stay in the informal sector.
In each period there is a large number of potential entrants in both sectors. Entry in the informal sector is free, while entry in the legal sector is conditional on the start-up cost c e . As in HR, the current value of the productivity shock for new entrants in the legal sector is drawn from the pdf ν(a). I make the same assumption also for new start-ups in the informal sector. The expected values of entry are:
and
A potential entrepreneur will start legally only if the value of entry in the legal sector W e , net of the entry cost c e , is bigger than the value of entry in the informal V e .
The economy is also populated by a set of identical households. The main di erence with HR is that, in my framework, households own both legal and informal rms, supply legal or informal indivisible labor and buy goods in both markets. Di erently from D'Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012), I explicitly di erentiate the good produced in the legal sector from the good produced in the informal sector. Similarly to HR, households have access to markets to diversify the idiosyncratic risk, so that the economy is equivalent to another economy with a representative household and the following intra-temporal utility function:
The per period utility function is u(ĉ t , l t ) = logĉ t + Hl t . It is de ned over leisure l t = − N t − N i t , which is the di erence between and total labor supplied in the legal (N t ) and informal (N i t ) sectors, and over the composite consumption goodĉ t . The consumption good is in turn a function of the consumption of the legal good c t and of the informal good c i t , as determined by the following CES aggregator:
The budget constraint of the household is the following:
where Π t are the aggregate pro ts from the legal rms, Π i t the aggregate pro ts from the informal rms and T t the lump sum transfers from the government. Importantly, T t does not include the payments of the startup costs, that are, therefore, a pure waste of resources. In addition, in this baseline model speci cation I assume the absence of taxation on labor⁴. I denote the optimal levels of consumption, obtained solving the household problem, as
, while the optimal labor supplies as
4 In appendix I show that the inclusion of labor taxation does not signi cantly alter the results.
The state of the economy in each period is summarized by two measures of legal and informal rms, µ t (a t , n t ) and µ i t (a t , n i t ). Given the rms' optimal decisions rules, obtained by solving their optimization problems, it is possible to characterize the dynamic behavior of these two measures. I denote with X(a t , n t ; p t ) an indicator function that is equal to 1 in case the legal rm chooses to stay in the market (and zero if the decision is to exit). I also denote with X i (a t ; q t , p t ) an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the informal rm chooses to stay in the informal sector (and zero if the decision is to exit or switch to the legal sector) and with χ(a t ; q t , p t ) an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the informal rm chooses to switch to the formal sector (and zero if the decision is to exit or to stay in the informal sector). In both cases I assume that, if a rm is indi erent between stay and exit or stay and switch, it stays. Then I can summarize the evolution of the state of the economy with the following mappings de ned over the measures µ and µ i :
where B and B i are the e ective mass of entrants in the o cial and informal sectors and where N(a t , n t ; p t )
and N i (a t ; q t , p t ) are, respectively, the optimal choices of labor input by o cial and informal rms in period t. In each of the above expressions, the rst term is the contribution of incumbent rms that choose to stay in the market and the second term is the contribution of new entrants. The third term in the rst expression is the contribution of informal rms that switch to the legal sector. With a slight abuse of notation I de ne, for each period, 
where Θ * = {p * , B * }, Θ i * = {q * , B i * } and Π * , Π i * and T * are all computed according to the equilibrium values. The rst two relationships state that, respectively, labor and goods markets must clear in both the informal and the legal sector. The third line states the free entry conditions: providing the assumption of an unlimited supply of potential entrants, in equilibrium the value of entry must be at most equal to the cost of entry, with equality if entry is positive. The last two conditions state that the economy is in a stationary equilibrium, with the distribution over the state reproducing itself every period at the equilibrium values. In appendix, I prove the existence of a model equilibrium under mild regularity (mostly technical) conditions. Note that the model can exhibit di erent types of equilibria. In particular, there can be equilibria with entry and exit in both sectors and equilibria without. In addition, an equilibrium can involve entry and exit in both sectors and a measure of rms switching from the informal to the legal sector, but it can as well involve no switch. It is also possible to have mixed situations with, for instance, positive entry in the informal sector, switching and positive exit in the legal sector, but without entry in the legal sector and without exit in the informal. In what follows, I will focus on the interesting case of an equilibrium with entry and exit in both sectors and switch. I provide a set of su cient conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium in appendix. Intuitively, given the structure of the model, there will always be entry and exit in equilibrium in both sectors as long as the demand for both goods is well de ned. A su cient condition is: bounded prices, ψ ≠ and ψ ≠ . If the price is not bounded in one market, then the demand can possibly be zero and, if demand is zero, there will be no rm willing to produce. Similarly, in case ψ = or ψ = , the consumers will not demand the good in one of the two markets and no rm will be willing to produce. In addition, the market equilibrium involves switching if the equilibrium price in the legal market is su ciently higher than the illegal, so that the most productive informal rms will nd it pro table to switch. How much higher it should be depends, among others, on the consumer preferences for the legal versus illegal good, on the technological shock and on the xed and variable costs. For the baseline model parametrization, but also along all the robustness checks that I perform, this condition is always satis ed and the equilibria always involve switching.
Parameters and Calibration
Since the model cannot be solved analytically, I proceed to a numerical solution. The goal of the analysis is to evaluate numerically the e ect of di erent costs of the legal system on the size and composition of the informal economy. Therefore, in order to isolate these e ects from other confounding factors, I x all the other dimensions of the economy along the numerical exercises. The problem is how to choose the benchmark values of the parameters and calibration targets. I choose to target the benchmark simulation to the US economy, largely for data availability reasons. The drawback of this strategy, however, is that I'm choosing a developed country to parameterize a model of the informal economy, which is arguably a more widespread phenomenon in developing countries. To validate my strategy, I discuss two di erent sets of results: rst, I show (in section 7) that the cross country measure of the informal economy that I obtain with this strategy is reasonable. Second, I propose (in section 8) a detailed discussion of the robustness of the numerical results, including the possibility of a calibration to an economy with a bigger informal sector.
The strategy that I use is to x as many parameters as possible using outside information and then to calibrate the remaining ones to match rm level statistics from the Census of Manufacturers (similarly to HR). For the parameters for which I don't have hard evidence, I simply check the robustness to a wide range of alternatives. The goal of the calibration is to have a characterization of the legal sector that is in line with the empirical evidence. Since I focus on the stationary equilibrium of the model, I consider just one wave of the census.
According to the time span of the census, I set the time period in my model to 5 years. The discount rate β is xed at a value that implies, in steady state, an interest rate of 4% a year. The labor share of income α is set to . , consistently with the US empirical evidence. To keep the di erences across the two sectors at a minimum, I assume equal technologies, xing η = α (I relax this assumption in section 8). The output tax τ y is 29% per year, which is the average of the ratio between tax receipts on corporate income and corporate income from 1960 to 2003 in the US (Bureau of Economic Analysis data). The price p is the numeraire. I set the cost of entry c e to 0.5% of o cial GDP⁵, consistently with the evidence reported by Djankov et al. (2002) for the US (see infra). I also set the ring costs ϕ at 0 consistently with the lower bound measure in Botero et al. (2004) (see infra; a di erent parametrization with the upper bound measure delivered very similar results). I assume that the exogenous technological shock for incumbents follows an autoregressive process:
where ε t ∼ i.i.d. N( , σ ). Following HR, I assume that the pdf ν(a) for entrants is simply uniform. The two preference parameters ψ and z map relative price di erences into a relative size of the informal economy. Consistently with the calibration strategy, it is important to set them at a value that delivers a reasonable size of the informal economy in the US. Since there is no hard information to set these values, the best approach is to consider the robustness to a wide range of possibilities. It turns out that these two parameters are not crucial for the results that I discuss in the paper, so that the lack of hard information is not a huge issue. From an operational standpoint, in the benchmark model parametrization I set these two parameters at rather arbitrary values that deliver a reasonable relative size of the informal sector, ψ = . and z = . , and I discuss the robustness to many alternatives in section 8. The remaining preference parameter H is set at 1.9 to deliver a workers' share in the population of 60%.
The monitoring probability π a ects the productivity di erential across sectors and, therefore, the relative price in the informal market. Its real world counterpart is the probability of discovering a business in the informal economy, which should be di erent from the probability of a tax audit. Since there is no available information about this probability, I adopt a robustness approach again. As for the preference parameters, I found that the auditing probability is not essential for most of the numerical results. Therefore I proceed again choosing a rather arbitrary but reasonable value for the benchmark parametrization, π = . , and discussing the robustness to alternative values in section 8.
For what concerns the xed costs c f and c u , there are a priori reasons to believe that the xed cost is higher in the legal sector, for instance because of the cumbersome regulatory environment or the complex tax system. Nevertheless, there are also a priori reasons to believe that the xed cost is higher in the informal sector, because of the costs of informality previously discussed. Nevertheless, providing that one of the main background assumptions of the analysis is that the legal system is indeed costly, I assume that the xed cost in the legal sector c f is higher than its illegal counterpart c u . To avoid a big asymmetry between the two sectors, I assume that it is just 10% bigger. This choice is also sensible from an empirical perspective, albeit conservatively. Data from the Informal Survey and from the Micro Survey, implemented by the World Bank (see La Porta and Shleifer 2008) , show that informals and legal rms spend the same amount of money on protection and security, but that legal rms spend more to comply with regulations. For practical purposes, this assumption entails placing a linear restriction in the calibration exercise, reducing the dimensionality of the set of parameters to calibrate. Importantly, this cost asymmetry is almost inconsequential for the bulk of the results: even remaining agnostic about the relative magnitude of the two xed costs, setting them as equal, would result in the same model properties and counterfactual results. My choice of slightly di erent costs is actually for convenience: it signi cantly eases the computational burden, making it faster to nd an equilibrium with switching informals. I then calibrate the two, linearly related, xed costs c f and c u , together with the two parameters of the technological shocks ρ and σ, to reach 3 targets from the census of manufacturers: an exit rate of %, a job turnover rate of % and a coe cient of serial correlation of employment of . . The resulting parameters value are: c f = . , c u = .
, ρ = . and σ = . . Perhaps the persistence of the technological shock might seem high, especially as compared to HR. Nevertheless, it is quite di cult to obtain a plausible exit rate from the model without appealing to persistent technological shocks. Moreover, as shown in section 8, this high persistence does not in uence the model results signi cantly and thus should not be viewed as a limitation of the analysis.
I obtain a stationary equilibrium with a legal sector that behaves coherently with the empirical evidence summarized, among others, by Evans (1987) , Davis and Haltiwanger (1988) and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) . The reason is that I follow the calibration strategy of other papers of industry equilibrium that match the same empirical information. In particular, the size distribution of the legal rms is stochastically increasing in age and the exiting probability is decreasing in rms' age. Also, as in most model of industry dynamics similar to Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (193) , small rms account for most of the hiring rate, while large rms account for most of the ring.
Informality as the Doorstep of Legality
I now show that the characterization of the informal sector implied by the model is consistent with the available survey evidence, as reported by Maloney (2004) , La Porta and Shleifer (2008) , De Paula and Scheinkman (2008) and Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) : small establishments, less productive, exposed to market whims and thus characterized by a high death rate.
Looking at the stationary distributions of the size of legal and informal rms, I nd that informal rms are signi cantly smaller than their legal counterparts, both in terms of output and in terms of employment. Looking at the stationary distributions of productivity, I nd that the productivity is also much smaller, on average, in the informal sector. Both model results are in line with the survey evidence from the World Bank's Informal Survey and Micro Survey (La Porta and Shleifer 2008) . Consistently with the smaller size and productivity of informal rms, the model also delivers a signi cantly higher exit rate in the informal sector.
The measure of switching informal rms is small. In the stationary equilibrium of the benchmark model, roughly 30% of the informals legalize. This implies that, in each period, only 1.5% of the legal rms were previously informal. This feature of the model is indeed consistent with the survey evidence summarized by LaPorta and Shleifer (2008) , who report that, in their sample of developing countries (typically characterized by a higher start-up cost and, therefore, by a bigger number of informal rms), 91.2% of legal rms started as legal (on average).
A further feature of the stationary equilibrium is that, in the ve years' period that I use in the calibration, informal rms that experience favorable productivity shocks legalize, while less productive informals exit. In this respect, the model implies a characterization of the informal sector as a Doorstep of the o cial: many rms start informally on a small scale, then waiting to become more productive and to grow before legalizing. This pattern is indeed consistent with the survey evidence reported by Maloney (2004) , showing that, in Mexico, informal rms tend to become formal with age and size. The model is also consistent with De Paula and Scheinkman (2008) who report that, in Brazil, only bigger and more productive informals nd it pro table to legalize. A further implication of the model is that informal rms legalize quickly, in line with the survey evidence reported by LaPorta and Shleifer (2008) . In their sample, 2/3 of the rms legalize within 5 years and 80% within 10 years. These numbers are indeed what the model would deliver as an equilibrium if parameterized with the start-up and operational costs of the developing countries where the surveys were conducted (see infra).
The Doorstep theory is akin to the idea of entrepreneurship and selection by Jovanovic (1982) . In a nutshell, potential entrepreneurs can learn about their productivity and the market conditions only if they actually start a business. If they are not productive, they are forced to drop out of the market. My model adds to this theory that if the costs to start a business legally are high, then the entrepreneurs choose to go through the learning stage in the informal sector. Therefore the Doorstep theory explains the lower productivity of the informal rms as a consequence of the dynamics of new start-ups in the presence of entry barriers, not simply as a consequence of their lower productivity.
Numerical Analysis
The quantitative experiment entails plugging in the calibrated model the observed costs of the legal system, to analyze the implied cross country di erences in the size of the informal economy. I interpret this di erences as the one that would prevail if the only cross country heterogeneity entailed the start-up costs, the labor market regulations and the tax rate, holding xed all the other characteristics of the economy. Two main results stand out. First, the cross country variability in the extent of labor market regulations and taxation account only for a small fraction of the cross country variability of the size of the informal economy, while the start-up costs account for most of it. Second, the start-up costs account for a greater fraction of the informal economy in the countries characterized by bigger informal sectors.
. Data
I consider two measures of the start-up costs from Djankov et al. (2002) : the rst (ce) simply takes into account "All identi able o cial expenses" to get the authorizations required to start a business legally, thus excluding the eventual bribes. The second (cetime) adds to the rst a "Monetized value of the entrepreneurs' time", accounting also for the length of the bureaucratic procedures. Both variables are measured as a percentage of the GDP per capita of the country. A third measure of the start-up cost (wbce) is from the World Bank Development Indicators and it refers to the total cost to start a business as a percentage of GNP per capita.
I take two measures of ring cost from Botero et al. (2004) . The rst (sev) is the weeks of "Legally mandated severance payment requirements in case of redundancy dismissal". The second (sevadv) adds to the rst the "Legally mandated advance notice requirements", assuming that the wage paid during the notice period is an additional monetary cost for a rm willing to lay-o a redundant worker. The third measure of ring costs (wbsev) is reported by the World Bank Development Indicators. The tax pressure (tax) is from the World Bank Development Indicators and it quanti es the tax rate on income pro ts and capital gains.
I construct two data sets: the rst (Mixed Sample) with the data from Djankov et al. (2002) and from Botero et al. (2004) , together with the tax rates from the WB; the second (WB Sample) using only data from the WB, averaged over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . In both cases, the data are collected for the biggest sample of countries for which there is information on all variables, which means 78 countries in the rst case and 90 in the second (note that not all the countries in the Mixed sample are included in the WB sample). These numbers do not include the countries with extremely high values of the cost of entry in excess of 150% of the GDP per capita (not taking into account the opportunity cost of time), that I excluded from the analysis.
Overall, there is evidence of a signi cant cross sectional variability of the three costs, which excludes the possibility that the numerical results are driven by a higher cross sectional variability of the start-up costs. In particular, the coe cients of variation of the start-up costs in the mixed samples are equal to, respectively, 63.9% (ce) and 80.3% (cetime). The coe cients of variation of the ring cost variables are equal to 69.7% (sev) and 86.3% (sevadv) and the coe cient of variation of tax rates is equal to 59.9%. As far as the WB sample is concerned, the coe cients are 54.5% (wbce), 77% (wbsev) and 91.8% (wbtax).
. Cost Decomposition
The model implies that the cross country di erentials in the start-up costs account, on average, for 74.9% of the cross country variability of the size of the informal economy. Labor market regulations and tax rates account for, respectively, 10.9% and 14.2%. Using the alternative data from the WB, the fractions become, 63.9%, 5.2% and 30.9%. The rst row of Table 1 summarizes the results and includes also the median values and the standard deviations of the individual contributions. The procedure behind the decomposition is the following. First, I feed in the model the three costs of the legal system to obtain the simulated size of the informal economy. Then I exclude one of the costs and obtain a di erent measure of the informal economy. I interpret the di erence between these two measures as the contribution of the excluded cost to the simulated informal economy. I obtain the relative contribution of all costs simply dividing the absolute value of the individual contributions by the sum of the absolute values of the contributions.
Further decomposing the contributions by quartiles of the informal economy reveals an additional result: the start-up costs are more important in countries with bigger informal sectors. The second part of Table 1 reports the average and median contributions of the costs in the four quartiles of the distribution of the informal economy, together with the standard deviations of the contributions. The contribution of the start-up cost to the informal sector is higher at the top quartile and the variability of its contribution lower. In greater detail, the start-up cost, in the mixed sample, accounts for 61% of the informal economy in the bottom quartile of the distribution but for 80% in the top quartile. Even more striking is the di erence in the WB sample, with just 40% in the lower quartile and 80% in the top. Also the standard deviation drops from around 27% in the bottom quartile to 4% in the top one. The specular result is that the contribution of the tax rate is much smaller in the top quartile, with a value that drops from the 56% to the 9% in the WB sample and from 32% to 7% in the mixed sample.
. Regressions with the Simulated Informal Economy
A further way to assess the relative importance of the costs is running a regression of the simulated size on the costs used to simulate it. The model is the following: and signi cant at the 1% level, γ = .
and not signi cant and γ = .
and signi cant at the 1% level, with an R very close to 1 as expected. The rst important evidence is that labor market regulation does not explain at all the size of the informal economy. The second is that the contribution of the tax rate, while statistically signi cant, is much smaller than the contribution of the start-up cost. In fact, an increase of one standard deviation in the tax rate, equal to 13%, predicts a 2% increase of y i . The di erence between the third and the rst quartile of the tax rate, equal to 18%, predicts a 2.7% increase. Conversely, a one standard deviation increase of c e , equal to 27%, predicts an 8.7% increase of y i , while the di erence between the third and the rst quartile, equal to 30%, a 9.75% increase. The results obtained with the lower bound measures of 
Notes:
Summary statistics relative to the distribution of countries simulated from the model using data on the costs of the legal sector and keeping the parametrization at its benchmark level. Mixed Sample: c e = ce is the start-up cost as a percentage of GDP per capita computed by Djankov et al. (2002) . ϕ = sev is the per period wage equivalent of the weeks of severance payments reported by Botero et al. (2004) . τ y = tax is the tax rate on income, pro ts and capital gains from the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI). 78 countries simulated. WB Sample: all data are from the WBDI and averages over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . c e = wbce is the start-up cost as a percentage of GNI per capita. ϕ = wbsev is the per period wage equivalent of the weeks of severance payments and τ y = wbtax is the tax rate on income, pro ts and capital gains. 90 countries simulated. The Quartiles refer to the distribution of the relative size of the informal economy implied by the model. the costs, or with combinations of lower and upper bound measures, are indeed very similar, as they are the results obtained with the WB sample.
. Comparative Statics
I now analyze the e ects of the costs on the model equilibrium in greater detail. The results are reported in Table 2 .
As already stressed by Hopenhayn (1992) and, although in the context of a di erent model, by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , the start-up cost protects incumbent legal rms, reducing both the rate of entry and the rate of exit, lowering output and raising its price⁶. Overall, a higher start-up cost increases the pro ts of legal rms and their average size, thus creating rents for big incumbent rms, isolating them from the threat of potential competition. Nevertheless, the pro ts of small legal businesses are still very close to zero even after the introduction of entry barriers: the real bene ciaries of the entry regulations are the bigger and more productive incumbents, whose pro ts grow faster than the pro ts of small incumbents. Importantly, the cost of entry does not protect incumbent rms from the competition of informals that legalize⁷. Namely, a higher start-up cost, by raising the pro tability of the legal rms, and in particular of the bigger and most productive legal establishments, delivers a contemporaneous increase of both the costs and the bene ts of producing legally, leaving the terms of the trade-o barely a ected. As a consequence, the switching rate does not change signi cantly. This result implies, among other things, that the bene t of entry barriers for incumbents are overstated without a careful analysis of the e ects on the informal sector.
Together with the lower entry in the legal sector, a higher start-up cost delivers also more entry in the informal sector. Entrants in the legal sector are such that W e (p t ) − c e > V e (q t , p t ). Since the value of entry in the legal sector is not much a ected by c e , because the pro ts of smaller rms respond much less than the pro ts of bigger rms to the introduction of entry barriers, an increase in c e displaces part of the new entrants in the informal sector⁸. The cost of entry in the legal sector determines an increase in the relative size of the informal economy, through an increased numerator and a decreased denominator. Figure 1 shows the changes in the distributions of rms that follow the increase of the start-up costs: the size distribution of legal rms is increasing, with a clear increased measure of bigger rms. The distribution of informal rms shows a higher concentration in the lower tail, substantially driven by the increased informal entry. Increased ring costs, by reducing the exibility of legal rms, induce lower pro ts in the legal sector and a decreased present value of legal rms⁹. This, in turn, increases the relative price in the legal market, lowering the switching rate. The average size and the average productivity of the legal rms are lower. In the informal sector, conversely, the average productivity is higher, since there is a lower mass of informals that switch. The economy is also characterized by a more stable labor force: hiring and ring rates are both lower, as is the job turnover rate, while the serial correlation in employment is higher. In line with HR, there is also a reduction of aggregate employment.
An increased output tax induces a decrease in legal output that, by itself, drives an increase in the relative size of the informal economy. The average size and the average productivity of the legal rms decline and the legal price increases. The higher taxes induce also a smaller expected bene t of legalization, which compensates the increased price, without any signi cative e ect on the switching rate. 6 Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) found also empirical evidence that, in a sample of French manufacturing establishments, more strict entry regulations explain lower sales, lower rates of employment, higher concentration (and so size) and higher prices. 7 Estrin and Mickiewicz (2012) discuss extensively the relationship between entry by new entrepreneurs and the size of the informal economy. 8 This property of the model is consistent with the empirical results by Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) , that nd both a smaller rate of entry and a higher size of entry in the countries characterized by higher start-up costs. 9 This result is in line with the empirical evidence summarized by Almeida and Carneiro (2005) . They report that, in Brazil, increasing the enforcement of labor market regulations determines not only with a decrease of the informal labor force, but also a decreased value added per worker and sales per worker. 
Empirical Validation
In this section, I propose an empirical test to validate the model. In particular, I test its ability to deliver empirically plausible measures of the size of the informal economy. In particular, I compare the model based measures of the informal economy to the available empirical estimates. Indeed it is necessary to be extremely careful when using these estimates as benchmarks, since all the estimation methods hinge on strong empirical assumptions. Nevertheless, it is also the case that these estimation methods are based on indicators that are extremely likely to be correlated with the extent of informal activities. In other words, it is safe to assume that the estimates provide an idea of the cross country variability of the informal economy consistent with the cross country variability of its indicators.
I consider 4 di erent estimates of the size of the informal economy. 3 measures are based on indirect estimation methods: the Aggregate Electricity Consumption method (Johnson et al. 1997 and 1998) , the Household Electricity Consumption method (Lacko' 1999 ) and Schneider's (DY)MIMIC method (Schneider 2005) , which is itself a combination of the Loayza's MIMIC method (Loayza 1996 , Giles 1999 and of the Currency Demand method (Tanzi 1983) (Schneider 2005) . Lower right panel: Lacko's household electricity consumption estimates (Lacko' (1999) ). Lower left panel: Johnson's electricity consumption estimates (Johnson et al. (1997) and (1998) ). Upper left panel: average estimates over the previous method and over WEF survey measures as rescaled by LaPorta and Shleifer (2008) . All the estimates are obtained with an Epanechnikov kernel. The number of observations varies.
Importantly, the correct interpretation of the model measures is of a relative size of the informal economy that would prevail in a country exactly similar to the US except for the level of taxes, the entry cost and the labor market regulations. Therefore, in this exercise I consider the estimated size of the informal economy relative to the size in the US. Figure 2 plots the cross sectional distribution of the relative measure of the informal economy delivered by the model together with the cross sectional distribution delivered by the empirical estimation methods. The model measures are obtained feeding in the model the upper bound measure of labor market regulation (sevadv) and the upper bound measure of the start-up cost (cetime), together with the measure of tax pressure (tax). As the plot shows, the model provides an empirically reasonable measure of the informal economy. The most interesting result is perhaps the similarity with the average empirical estimates, since they smooth out the extreme values delivered by some estimation methods. The results obtained feeding in the model the lower bound measures of the costs, or combinations of lower bound and upper bound measures, are indeed very similar. The WB cost measures also deliver similar results.
Another way to look at this result is to compute the correlation between the model based relative estimates and the empirical estimates. Table 3 reports these correlations, both by estimation methods (including the average, minimum and maximum empirical estimates) and by stage of economic development. The table refers again to the model based measures obtained with the upper bound measures of the costs. Overall the correlation is higher for OECD countries and for the Electricity Consumption methods. This last evidence is particularly important, since these estimates are not constructed using any of the information that I use to 
Notes:
Correlations between the estimated size of the informal economy and the size of the informal economy delivered by the simulated model with the upper bound measure of labor market regulation (sevadv), the upper bound measure of the start-up cost (cetime) and the measure of tax pressure (tax). Johnson are the estimates obtained with the electricity consumption method (Johnson et al. (1997) and (1998)), Lacko' the estimates obtained with the Household Electricity Consumption method (Lacko' (1999) ), MIMIC the estimates obtained by Schneider (2005) with the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes method and WEF the survey based measure of the informal economy rescaled by LaPorta and Shleifer (2008) . Avg is the average estimate, Min is the smallest estimate and Max the biggest. The number of observations is in brackets.
construct the model. The correlation values for the entire sample range from the 38% of the MIMIC measures to the 62% of the Lacko' Electricity Consumption method. The low correlation with the MIMIC measures, in turn, depends mostly on the small correlation with the estimates for transition and developing countries.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I analyze the robustness of the results to alternative assumptions and parameterizations. The rst exercise entails relaxing the assumption of equal technologies in the two sectors. DeSoto (1989), Lemieux et al. (1994) and Koreskova (2006) , among others, claim that informals lack in organization and that they are unable to reach economies of scale, since they must remain small to avoid detection. Therefore, it is plausible that the same labor force is used less e ciently in the informal sector with, in the model, η < α. In this di erent scenario, for a value of η that is between 10% and 20% lower than α, the model equilibrium is characterized by a non-zero measure of (highly productive) informal rms that choose to stay informal. As a direct consequence, the average size of informal rms is higher, and so is their average productivity. Also the relative size of the informal economy is bigger, both in terms of output (on average by 40% in the cross section) and labor input. There are two new features of the model that signi cantly a ect the comparative statics results. First, the introduction of entry barriers now implies an increase of the switching rate: the bene ts of legalization (the pro ts available in the legal sector) grow faster than the costs for a big pool of (relatively) high productive informals. However, the entry rate in the illegal sector also grows faster than in the benchmark model parametrization. The reason is the higher anticipated pro ts from a future switch to the legal sector, which happens in case of a su ciently high productivity shock. Overall, the average size of the hidden economy grows. Second, the introduction of ring costs does not trigger a signi cative increase of the measure of rms that remain informal, with an overall lower growth of the informal sector. The reason is that many of those rms now remain informal even in case of a zero ring cost. In conclusion, assuming a technological asymmetry between the legal and the informal sector results in a similar e ect of the entry cost but in a lower e ect of labor market regulations, con rming the main results of the paper.
Changing the auditing probability π impacts the productivity di erential across sectors. In the benchmark parametrization, the output tax rate is higher than the auditing probability, thus determining an advantage for informals. Providing that this might seem an unreasonable scenario, I solved the model for a higher probability of auditing, in particular equal to 2 times its estimated value for the US. The results are not a ected. Speci cally, the higher value of the probability delivers a lower relative size of the informal sector, determined both by the lower e ective productivity and by the higher price in the informal market. Despite this di erence, all the comparative statics results relative to c e and ϕ are una ected. The e ect of taxes, on the other hand, is substantially lower. This is because the same tax rate increase delivers now a smaller productivity di erential and thus a lower decrease of the legal production. The model delivers a ratio of informal to formal consumption (or output) that depends on the relative price and upon the preference parameters ψ and z. Speci cally:
Essentially consumers buy goods from the informal market because it is customary. The custom (or habit) is determined by the parameter ψ, with a lower value associated with societies where informal goods or services are widespread and easily accessible. Depending on the relative price¹⁰ and the elasticity of substitution z, the fraction of informal goods purchased can be bigger or smaller, but, as long as ψ ≠ , it will never be equal to zero.
The question, then, is if the model results are robust to di erent values of z and ψ. A higher z delivers a higher relative size of the informal economy along all exercises, magnifying the e ect of the same relative price change. Viceversa, a lower value of z delivers a muted e ect with respect to the benchmark parametrization. The ranking of the costs according to their e ect on the informal economy should be preserved, unless the benchmark value of z was extremely high, which is not the case. Quantitatively speaking, doubling z would result in an e ect of c e that is roughly 2.5 times bigger than in the benchmark model, and in e ect of ϕ slightly less than two times more. Conversely, halving z results in a 30% lower e ect of c e and a 20% lower e ect of ϕ. Similar considerations apply for the tax rate τ y .
Similarly, the benchmark model parametrization implies an extremely low value of the relative size of the informal economy, consistently with the empirical evidence for the US, which is the consequence of a very small ψ. Nevertheless, this value does not in uence the comparative statics results, mainly because ψ is just a scale parameter, that can at most determine small changes in the level of entry. To test for robustness, I considered an hypothetic alternative country which is exactly equal to the US except for the relative size of the informal economy, which I set to 22%. I obtained this value xing ψ at 0.8 and keeping all the other parameters constant. The results are very similar to the benchmark US calibration. The only di erence is a slightly lower impact of c e , delivered by a slower increase of the entry rate in the informal sector.
Another potential source of concern regarding the results is the high persistency of the technology shock. In fact it is possible that the hiring rate is not signi cantly a ected by the ring cost simply because the rms anticipate that the job created will last for longer, highly discounting the future dismissal cost. Therefore the small impact of ϕ on the model equilibrium could be just a byproduct of the calibration. I did the same comparative statics exercise for a much smaller value of the shock persistency, 0.62 (the value used by HR and in other, partially di erent, models of industry dynamics like Hennessy and Whited 2005) without any major change. In particular, I found a slightly weaker e ect of c e , but the analysis still highlights it as the most important cost in relative terms. This weaker e ect of c e is a consequence of the lower expected continuation value of legal rms, that implies a lower switching rate and a higher exit rate in both sectors. In this scenario, the insulating e ect of the entry barrier, by raising the value of the legal rms, determines also an increase of the switching rate (with the bene ts of switching raising proportionately more than the costs) and thus a further increase of the aggregate output. In addition, the lower shock persistence delivers also a lower continuation value for the informals, which induces a lower entry in the informal sector for each value of the start-up cost. This e ect limits the expansion on the informal output that follows the introduction of entry barriers. In a nutshell, less persistent technology shocks make it also less attractive to start a new informal business. Importantly, with this level of shock persistence, it is almost impossible to calibrate the model to have an exit rate in the legal sector below 55%. In fact, the reported results are delivered for a benchmark exit rate of that implausibly high magnitude.
Conclusion
Imposing a high and, sometimes, disproportionate cost to legally start a business discourages potential entrepreneurs, making it more attractive to start informally. The contribution of this work shows that these start-up costs robustly explain the cross country variability of the size of the informal economy and, perhaps more importantly, shows it with a structural dynamic model, that allows for a clear interpretation of the e ects. The model itself is also shown to be empirically plausible, since it delivers a cross section of the informal economy that is very similar to all the available empirical estimates. In addition, the characteristics of the informal sector in the model are also shown to be consistent with the available survey evidence. The importance of barriers to entry to explain the informal economy is an alternative to the conclusion by La Porta and Shleifer (2008) . They interpret the smaller productivity of the informal rms as evidence against the Romantic theory of the informal sector, according to which the informal entrepreneurs are dynamic and productive, but somehow trapped in the informal sector by cumbersome regulations. I showed that the evidence of a lower productivity of the informals is also consistent with a Doorstep theory of informality, which exploits the dynamics of new start-ups in the presence of entry regulations. Nevertheless, with my model I cannot dismiss the theory by La Porta and Shleifer (2008) .
It is important to stress that the conclusion of the work must not be confused with a simplistic endorsement of the abolition of any form of product market regulation. In fact the paper argues against unnecessary bottlenecks in the bureaucratic process, whose only scope is rent seeking. It certainly does not argue against screening procedures that assess the quality of new entrants, that are likely to be welfare enhancing. In a sense, it is not desirable to eliminate the incentives for producing in the informal sector, exactly because this would translate into a potentially harmful product market deregulation. Making a parallel with the analysis of Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) , there is a trade-o between market failures and the informal economy, and tolerating a moderate size of the informal economy can be less dangerous that allowing an indiscriminate entry in the legal sector. The problems arise if the start-up costs reach extremely high values, or if the greatest part of them is accounted for by rent seeking behaviors (as it is the case, according to Djankov et al. 2002) : then the economy can end up with a big number of entrepreneurs that, operating in the informal economy, do not comply with the welfare improving regulations, fostering the emergence of the problems that the regulations are supposed to solve. In other words, reducing unnecessary entry barriers is a way to enforce a welfare enhancing regulation of the economy, which is otherwise threatened by the option to produce informally.
A potential drawback of the paper is that the structural modeling of the bene ts of the legal sector is severely limited. Legal rms have access to courts, which, more or less perfectly, can enforce contracts. Legal rms can also collateralize their capital to obtain loans, or they can just use the nancial market to raise new capital. They can also advertise the product, having access to markets beyond the local areas. In the paper, I modeled these features with a xed cost of informality, which I then calibrated. But this strategy does not allow for a good evaluation of the importance of these factors. The reason why I abstract from a structural modeling of these costs is to have a tractable framework and an easily interpretable comparative statics. However, although these exclusions are important from a theoretical standpoint, their quantitative importance is likely to be small. The access to external nancing, for instance, is almost precluded also to small legal rms (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Dabla Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste 2008) . Therefore, since new start-ups are small, it is not among the reasons for which entrepreneurs choose to start legally.
The access to courts is also unlikely to be an important advantage of legal rms in the countries where the judicial trials are long and unpredictable (Djankov et al. 2003) . The possibility of advertisement to reach more markets is also typical of large, expanding rms, while small businesses typically rely on word of mouth and personal reputation, which are also available to informals. These considerations suggest that the results of the analysis are strong, despite the stylized framework. A conceptual limitation of the paper is that it explains the informal economy as an optimal exit response (Hirschman 1970) to an oppressive state, without distinguishing this theory from an alternative based on ethical considerations and network e ects. To be speci c, there are some national or cultural contexts where informality is tolerated as an almost legitimate way of doing business and, therefore, where the costs for informals are very small. This social acceptance can also foster network e ects, since being informal among other informal rms is much less costly¹¹. In other words, it can be the absence of a law abiding population and the lack of a strong moral commitment to be the real determinant of a large informal sector, not rentseeking governments and bureaucracies. One possible defense of my analysis is that the social acceptance of informality can develop as a consequence of an oppressive state, so that the prior is indeed the cost of the legal system. Namely, the exit response triggered by the high costs of the legal system could foster a social acceptance of the response itself, that neutralizes the social stigma of informality.
A further limitation of the paper is that it only proposes an analysis of the cross sectional determinants of the informal economy. It does provide any answer to the extremely interesting question of what drives the growth or decline of the informal economy through time. Actually, the start-up cost is an unlikely candidate for such an explanation, since legal systems are typically very resilient to change. Furthermore, since I consider the stationary equilibrium of a dynamic model, I cannot use my numerical strategy to study time series variability at short horizons.
